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Resistance and reform: discourses
on marital law in Japan*
ETSUKO TOYODA AND DAVID CHAPMAN
Abstract: This article examines opinions concerning fufubessei (a married
couple retaining their birth surnames) posted on an online forum. Recently, the
topic of fufubessei has once again come under a spotlight, since the Japanese
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Code Article 750,
which stipulates that a married couple must choose either the husband’s or
wife’s surname upon marriage registration. Owing to the large number of
women forfeiting their surnames, the fufubessei issue has often been researched
from feminist perspectives, which may have hindered the voices of others. This
article analyzes, using text mining (quantitative analysis) and discourse analysis
(qualitative analysis), a large number of opinions from people of various cultural
backgrounds. The results of this study reveal a diversity of beliefs and attitudes
towards Article 750, reflecting the complexity of the issue. In general,
proponents of reform claim the law violates equality, rights and liberty. From
opponents there was a strong push to conform rather than to recognize a need
for individual choice. Moreover, the many personal narratives provided insight
into issues on the ground and revealed how many in Japanese society have dealt
with the law, social pressure and social expectations and why they have followed
the path they have chosen.
Keywords: Japan, name, civil code, marriage, family, society, discourse analysis,
text-mining
Introduction
Article 750 of the Japanese Civil Code stipulates that a ‘husband and wife shall
adopt the surname of the husband or wife in accordance with that which is
decided at the time of marriage’ (Japanese Law Translation). This seemingly
unbiased legislation is in fact highly divisive and places women in a particularly
vulnerable position as it forces couples into an ‘either-or’ choice requiring them
to either forfeit one of their surnames or choose an alternative to legal marriage.
*This research was conducted mainly at both the University of Melbourne and the University of
Queensland
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Currently 96 per cent of women in Japan relinquish their surname upon mar-
riage, some willingly and others very reluctantly (Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare 2007, Osaki 2015).
This issue has long been the subject of debate among feminists in Japan (e.g.,
Arichi 1999, Shin 2004, 2008, Tanaka 2012). However, the issue is not exclu-
sively about gender discrimination, it is also about diverse views influenced by
broader social and political factors. The issue of fufubessei has polarized the pub-
lic along a clear divide of those who support and those who oppose reform. How-
ever, the reasons are complicated and this is especially apparent among
participants in online debate forums. In analyzing a large number of opinions in
the Asahi Digital Forum we have used a critical discourse approach to situate the
issue in the broader social context of contemporary Japanese society. The specific
aims of this project are to survey a wide range of opinions on legal reform of Arti-
cle 750, to contextualize the issue historically, politically and culturally, to assess
the validity of arguments based on the evidence used to substantiate opinions
and to ascertain overarching themes where opinions differ on the issues raised.
The catalyst to increased online debate over this issue was the Japanese
Supreme Court decision in December 2015 regarding a lawsuit against the Japa-
nese government over Article 750 (e.g., Osaki 2015, Mainichi Shinbun 2015).
Early in 2015, news broke that a decision would be handed down at the Supreme
Court’s Grand Bench, and the prospect of a verdict that the Article was unconsti-
tutional became the subject of much debate in the media. Attention was height-
ened by the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision would be the conclusion to a
five-year legal battle by five plaintiffs. The five plaintiffs, who, with the support of
a group of lawyers, sued the Japanese nation claiming that Article 750 is a viola-
tion of the Japanese Constitution (Osaki 2015). The Constitution declares (1)
the people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; (2) equality of the
people; and (3) equal rights of a husband and a wife. The Supreme Court
announced its final decision on the matter and asserted that Article 750 was not
unconstitutional. In the lead up to the final arbitration and in the wake of it,
thousands of people were moved to post their opinions online. The forum is rich
in data, reflecting the opinions of a large swathe of the public, and provides a win-
dow into broader issues in contemporary Japanese society.
Background
In Japan, changing one’s family name is not a simple matter. Changing names,
for many people, means that a wife leaves her family to become a member of her
husband’s family. The high incidence of women changing their name can be
accounted for by historical legacy and social expectations. The modern legal sys-
tem of Japan was founded during the Meiji era (1868–1912) with the introduc-
tion of, amongst other legislation, the Household Registry Law (kosekiho,
enacted 1871 and effected 1872) and the Meiji Civil Code (minpo, promulgated
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1898). The Meiji Civil Code established the Japanese family (ie) system and
institutionalized patriarchy, which emphasized passage of authority from a male
head of household (koshu) to his successor, a male heir (Tsubuku and Brasor
1996, Chapman 2012, Tanaka 2012). The stress was placed on a generational
continuity of the family name and estate more than a strict adherence to blood-
line. In the rare case of the absence of a male heir, a man/boy could be adopted
into a family through the process of muko yoshi (Tanaka 2012) ensuring patrili-
neality. Although the ie system was abolished with the introduction of the new
constitution in 1947, the koseki family registration system survived. Despite mod-
ification to the koseki,many families in Japan still place significance on patrilineal
family lineage with the expectation that the wife will change their family name
upon marriage (Tanaka 2012).
In Japanese everyday life, terms such as nyuseki or seki o ireru (entering into a
koseki) are used to refer to the act of getting married. Legally, this simply means
that a new koseki is created for a newly married couple (one koseki per nuclear
family), and their chosen family name and each of the family members’ first
names (shita no namae) are added. However, socially, this expression continues
to carry a connotation that a bride enters the family into which she marries. This
subtle, but powerful expression reflects the broader social expectation that
women abandon their family name for their husband’s (Arichi 1999, Tanaka
2012). Shin (2004, p. 108) states, ‘it is a public ritual to assume the expected
roles of daughter-in-law (yome), which are to look after parents-in-law, produce a
male heir for the family, take care of a family tomb, and manage the housework’.
Although the expectation that a wife take up these roles may be decreasing,
everyday expressions reflecting the legacy of the patriarchal nature of the ie sys-
tem still abound. Some further examples of this are: shujin (husband, lit. master
of a house), okusan or kanai (wife, lit. someone inside the house), yome ni iku or
yomeiri (go/enter as a bride) and yome o morau (receive a bride), muko-yoshi (son-
in-law taken into a family), ie o tsugu (succeed to a family), atotori (heir), xx ke no
haka (grave tomb of xx family), senzo daidai (ancestors). These terms subtly per-
petuate historical legacies of family life in Japan.
In accordance with revisions to the 1947 constitution, a modified version of
the Civil Code was brought into effect (Yamanoue 1994, Shin 2004) in which
women no longer had to assume their husband’s surname as was stipulated in
the Meiji Civil Code (Yamanoue 1994). The New Civil Code Article 750
specifies that a couple selects either the husband’s or the wife’s surname as
their family name upon marriage registration (Shin 2008). Under this revised
law, both men and women are granted an equal right to choose the family
name. However, as mentioned above, the expectation and the reality are, in
almost all cases, that the married couple chooses the husband’s surname as
their family name. Furthermore, under Article 750, a married couple must
choose a common surname and if both parties decide to keep their own sur-
names their marriage cannot be accepted as a legal marriage and therefore not
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registered in the koseki system. This adversely impacts on legal benefits and
protection (Arichi 1999).
If a couple has registered their marriage in the koseki under the husband’s sur-
name, the wife will face numerous disadvantages (Arichi 1999, Shin 2008). For
example, only her first name is added to the husband’s koseki, she will be called
by her husband’s surname or, as the wife of her husband, she is required to spend
time, money and effort to change her surname, only her marital status becomes
publicly known (while her husband continues to be Mr. xxx), she may lose conti-
nuity in her career and she may be treated as a yome as described above. Owing
to the high percentage of women changing their surname in marriage, the
fufubessei issue has justifiably been approached from a feminist perspective. The
United Nations Commission on Human Rights has also recommended reforms
because it sees this patriarchal surname approach as hindering gender equality in
Japan (Tsubuku and Brasor 1996, Tanaka 2012). However, women are not the
only ones to encounter difficulties. In a society where the husband or the father is
expected to support his family, if the husband assumes his wife’s surname, his
masculinity may come into question and this act may be regarded by others to be
a dishonor to his birth family (Yamanoue 1994, Miyamoto, Ninomiya and Shin
2011). In the case of a Japanese national of foreign background, the requirement
to change one’s family name may raise issues related to cultural identity.
Grassroots movements and calls for social reform targeting this system have
been active since the mid-1980s. For example, one of the first grassroots associa-
tions, the Fufubessei Sentakusei o Susumeru Kai (Association Promoting Sepa-
rate Surname Option), has regularly held meetings and seminars and published
newsletters since its formation in 1984. This group has also been active in sup-
porting plaintiffs in relevant lawsuits, and in lobbying1 for law reform (Fufubessei
Sentakusei o Susumeru Kai 1995). Since 1998, Japanese legal scholars, together
with activist groups, have been advocating reform to allow couples to have a
choice in maintaining separate surnames (Shin 2004, MacClintock 2010). In the
1990s, this early movement led to the formation of many more associations, not
only in metropolitan areas, but also in regional areas, involving both female and
male members (Yamanoue 1994, Fufubessei Sentakusei o Susumeru Kai, Shin
2004). Many of these groups share information and act in solidarity (Shin 2004).
Moreover, these fast growing grassroots movements have drawn much media
attention with the number of newspaper articles featuring the fufubessei issue
increasing from 1989 to reach their first peak in 1996 (Shin 2008). This was the
year that Legislative Council (an advisory body to the justice minister) submitted
the report of a five-year study with recommendations for revisions to Article 750,
which if introduced would have had a direct bearing on the koseki system (Tsu-
buku and Brasor 1996, Arichi 1999). However, this action faced fierce opposi-
tion from the ruling coalition government, and in the end, the proposal was not
submitted to a National Diet session (Tsubuku and Brasor 1996). Ishiyama
(2009) investigated how three major newspapers (Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi)
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featured the fufubessei issue during the period of 1987–2006, and found that one
third of the total number of articles in this period of time featured in 1996 and
1997. The second peak was 2001, when the results of an opinion poll conducted
by the Cabinet Office showed that, for the first time, people who supported the
law reform outnumbered those who opposed it (Ishiyama 2009).
Behind the government’s fierce opposition to reform is a hub of ultra-right
groups collectively called the Nippon Kaigi. This organization was formed in
1997,2 a year after the Legislative Council submitted the proposal for the reform
of Civil Code 750 (Asahi Digital 2016), and has played a significant role in influ-
encing government response to calls for legal reform. According to the Nippon
Kaigi website, it lists as members or consultants many religious group affiliates,
business people, academics and a large number of politicians, which includes the
Prime Minister (Nippon Kaigi). The organization strongly opposes the option of
fufubessei for a married couple, with many sub-organizations under different
names all strongly lobbying by publishing booklets, online articles and online vid-
eos. They also regularly hold large-scale public gatherings and street speeches,
claiming that allowing separate surnames in a family would weaken family ties
and lead to the collapse of ‘good old’ (furuki yoki) family values, and conse-
quently destroy Japanese culture (Asahi Digital 2016, Nippon Kaigi). Their pro-
tests escalated in 2001 in response to the increase in proponents for law reform
(Asahi Digital 2016).
Data and analysis
The main data that we use in this study are comments posted on Asahi Digital,
which conducted an online survey between 3 and 22 December 2015 to investi-
gate public opinion on the possible reform of the statute in question.3 This most
recent survey received a total of 3,956 responses (1,640 men and 2,316 women
with the age range of teens to seventies) which would have been difficult to
achieve using other survey approaches. This survey captured public opinion dur-
ing the critical period between the pre- and post-Supreme Court decision over
the five-year legal battle. To the question ‘Do you support or oppose the law
reform to allow separate family names (fufubessei)?’, 2,814 cast their votes for
support, 1,011 in opposition, and 131 uncommitted. Given that Asahi is
regarded as a liberal newspaper, the majority support was no surprise. However,
the true value of this online forum can be found in the comments posted in the
free text box provided. Comments were left by 2,353 of the 2,814 proponents
(83.6 per cent) and 922 of 1011 opponents (91.2 per cent). The breakdown of
respondents is shown in Tables 1 and 2. The disparity in responses between men
and women (almost half of the proponents of law reform are married women and
slightly over half of the opponents are married men) suggests that the gender gap
in beliefs on this issue is significant. The marital status and the age range of the
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respondents suggest that the selection of family name can become an issue at the
time of marriage, or years after.
The online comments provide valuable information on perceptions of the gen-
eral public regarding fufubessei. Although early studies of online surveys argue
sample bias as a problem (Coomber 1997, Kehoe and Pitkow 1997), ubiquitous
computers and devices means access is less of a bias issue these days, particularly
in a country such as Japan where internet use is very high. However, in this sur-
vey, there is a lack of control over participant selection and the composition of
the sample has produced a gender and age bias (more women and more middle-
aged participants). Online surveys also create the possibility of repeat respond-
ents that saturated the survey with a particular view. Although there is a deviation
in opinion in this survey that suggests repeat respondents could have been low in
number, this is inconclusive. Given these weaknesses, a qualitative approach
minimizes misleading statistical trends by focusing on discursive content. A
quantitative approach would be less instructive, aside from providing general
trends (age, gender, and marital status) based on unverifiable figures. We
decided that a qualitative approach using critical discourse analysis would pro-
vide a richer data set and a deeper penetration into perceptions and opinions.
The advantages of this survey are that it attracted a relatively large number of
respondents, which provided a data format appropriate for the critical discourse
approach as adopted here. Anonymity in the survey likely generated honest opin-
ions from the contributors (Edwards and Huff 2003) within a limited and man-
ageable space providing succinct and clear summaries.
Table 1 Breakdown of respondents (gender and marital status)
Category Proponents of law reform Opponents of law reform
Total 2353 100.0% 922 100.0%
Female Married 1136 48.3% 272 29.5%
Female Single 448 19.0% 43 4.7%
Male Married 533 22.7% 462 50.1%
Male Single 236 10.0% 145 15.7%
Table 2 Breakdown of respondents (age)
Category Proponents of law reform Opponents of law reform
Total 2353 100.0% 922 100.0%
20s 246 9.6% 73 7.9%
30s 445 17.6% 163 17.7%
40s 725 29.1% 235 25.5%
50s 664 26.1% 215 23.3%
60s 383 13.7% 170 18.4%
70s 160 3.8% 66 7.2%
6 Resistance and reform
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Comments were analyzed in the following way:
(1) Text mining the comments to identify frequently-used terms on each side,
using a text-mining tool.4
(2) Random selection of 1,000 options that had at least one of the frequently-
used terms, using an online randomizer5 and User Local. This reduced
the number of opinions to a manageable number for qualitative analysis.
(3) Coding of each opinion (words, phrases, or sentences), classification of the
coded items into similar concepts, and then identification of themes (cat-
egories) from these concepts, using NVivo (qualitative data analysis
software).
(4) Sorting of the opinions according to their theme. We read the concepts
under each theme a few more times to make sure they indeed share a
common discourse.
(5) Further reading of a few hundred more randomized opinions to see
whether there are other opinions that are outside the identified themes.
(6) Analysis of the opinions sharing the same theme in detail in terms of their
language use, such as word groups, grammar features, and modality.
(7) Interpretation of the opinions taking the broader historical, political, cul-
tural and social context into consideration.
(8) Examination of these opinions in terms of authenticity (either opinions
were based on beliefs or based on facts).
By taking this rigorous analytical approach we reveal a holistic picture of the
complicated social context surrounding the fufubessei issue. We believe that this
inductive process overcomes the restricted nature that sometimes occurs with
one research perspective by presenting a broader interpretation of the phenome-
non. The following sections present the results of the analysis, with discussion
under a variety of themes.
Results and discussions
Frequently-used terms in comments of proponents and opponents
Ratios of high-frequency terms that appeared in comments are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows twenty high-frequency terms in proponents’ comments, while
Figure 3 shows twenty high-frequency terms that appear in opponents’ comments.
Different general ‘flavors’ of arguments between proponents and opponents
have emerged through the text mining analysis. Proponents’ comments are
mainly about issues of choice, gender, the use of name and procedure, whereas
opponents’ comments appear to concentrate on family, children, the country
(Japan) and the family system. However, the frequent terms also include some
that are ambiguous, such as ‘family tie’ and ‘legal marriage’ in proponents’
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comments, and ‘separate-surname couples’ in opponents’ comments. After
perusing the comments, the high frequency words have sometimes been used to
quote and refute the other side’s arguments. Further statistical analysis on the
frequent terms without context may lead to erroneous results. Determining how
these terms are used in discourse is essential and the following section provides
the contexts in which the terms were used.
Below, under each theme, we discuss the language used, the opinions
expressed and the validity of the argument presented.6 The analysis reveals the
extent of complexity and diversity of opinions related to this issue.
Figure 1 Ratios of high-frequency terms
8 Resistance and reform
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Choice
In the online forum, many proponents for reform advocated for choice, and
asked for a widening of options in choosing surnames. This is usually grounded
in the argument that Japanese society is increasingly diverse and legislation is
woefully inadequate to address this change. Some proposed, in addition to a sep-
arate birth surname for each spouse, that a hyphenated surname or a new family
name be made an option. One writes, ‘Just like we choose how to live, we should
be able to choose what to call ourselves’. Opponents, however, see no need for
widening choice for what they refer to as the interests of ‘minorities’ (shosusha).
This position appears frequently not only in opposing greater choice, but in dis-
course opposing the reform itself. Opponents are critical of those advocating
change for being self-absorbed and egoistical. Two reasons for this are often
mentioned: (1) if people are given freedom to make an individual choice, social
order will be lost, and (2) that children will be the victims of such chaos.
Proponents tend to accuse opponents of indifference to their opinions and
stress that Japanese society must acknowledge and accept diversity, diverse val-
ues, and diverse lives. Examples of this discourse are as follows: ‘Society becomes
rich only when people acknowledge different opinions and generously accept
Figure 2 Twenty high-frequency terms in proponents’ comments
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them’, ‘When there are people who are disadvantaged by the current law, the law
should be reformed’, ‘Society needs to be flexible to accommodate minorities’,
and ‘We need to save people who suffer’. In this discourse, modals showing
proponents’ strong beliefs such as ‘must’ (nakutewa), ‘have to’ (nakereba),
‘should be’ (beki), ‘need to be’ (hitsuyo ga aru) are accompanied with long clarifi-
cations highlighting the importance placed on this point by proponents. To the
accusation of being self-centered and egoistic, proponents argue that their choice
of name will only affect those concerned, not those who wish to continue the cur-
rent custom.
Outside of Japan, an increasing number of countries provide multiple options
(e.g., husband’s surname, wife’s surname, separate surnames, hyphenated
surname or new name) as family styles diversify (Lockwood et al. 2011,
MacEacheron 2016). Proponents provide abundant examples where such
options are necessary. In response, opponents do not provide evidence or a clear
explanation of how greater choice disturbs social order, apart from claiming that
such options will confuse (konran). Opponents make claims that the focus on the
individual is ‘egoistic’ (wagamama), ‘idiosyncratic’ (kii na) and represents only a
‘minority’ (shosusha) of the population.
Figure 3 Twenty high-frequency terms in opponents’ comments
10 Resistance and reform
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Concerns about the welfare of children frequently appear in the opposing opin-
ions. Some discursive examples of this are: ‘I feel sorry for children’, ‘Children
will be confused’, ‘Children will be bullied if the parents do not have the same
surname’, ‘Without a common family name, children cannot feel part of a family’
and ‘Society cannot determine parents and children, brother and sisters, if they
had different names’. Opponents list a number of dire futures for children born
in a family with separate surnames, using assertive expressions and predictions
without providing supporting evidence. Some of them describe proponents as
selfish people who ignore the wellbeing of children.
These comments are derived from a normative assumption that a Japanese
family consists of a heterosexual nuclear family with a husband, a wife and chil-
dren that all share a common surname. According to the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare (2013), however, the divorce rate in Japan is rising, and
alongside this is a growing social acceptance of divorce generally. Approximately
60 per cent of divorce cases in Japan are couples with children, and 80 per cent
of these children remain with their mothers (Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare 2013). If these children tend to become the target of bullies because they
are from non-traditional families, as described by opponents, then accepting
more non-traditional families would perhaps have a positive impact in reducing
such discrimination. Nevertheless, both sides expressed concern for the welfare
of children.
A significant part of the argument here focuses on the present ‘normal’ as
reflected in legislation, in contrast to what a ‘new’ more accepting ‘normal’ could
be through legal reform. Proponents argue that it is important for children to
learn diverse values from an early age. Some people offered their own situation,
in which parents and children with different surnames live together with little or
no harmful effects as an example. The argument against traditional normativity
commonly appears in the discourse: ‘Children are flexible in their thinking.
When they grow up in a family with more than one family name, they take it as
normal’. Others say that once people start to see separate family names being
used, it will become ‘normal’. The discussion pushes back against notions of nor-
mativity and calls for a recognition of a diversifying society and changing family
dynamics. Opponents to reform, however, see this as affecting only a small num-
ber and as such the issue is insignificant and does not justify legislative change.
Liberty and equality
Another theme that arose in discussions focused on the choice of one’s surname
after marriage, was that of liberty and equality. Proponents for reform claimed
that, in accordance with the Japanese constitution, liberty and equality should be
protected by civil laws. This discourse was framed in various ways such as, ‘a basic
human right’ (kihonteki jinken), ‘a right to self-determination’ ( jiko kettei ken), ‘a
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right to self-naming’ (nanoru kenri), ‘a right to pursue happiness’ (kofuku tsuikyu
ken), ‘a right to individuality’ ( jinkaku ken), ‘a right to equality’ (byodo ken).
In these discussions, those who oppose the reform argued against it by saying
that claims along the line of civil rights were illogical and that the opponents sim-
ply did not understand why ‘this trivial name issue’ is discussed in relation to
‘rights’, ‘liberty’, and ‘equality’. Moreover, they argued that legal reform is not
an issue for individuals, but that it is a larger social issue and that if reform of
Article 750 were enacted it would adversely affect ‘social order’ in Japan. The
umbrella term ‘social order’ subsumes other related terms such as ‘society’ (sha-
kai), ‘social norms’ (shakai kihan), ‘socially accepted ideas’ (shakai tsunen),
‘society as a whole’ (shakai zentai), ‘social system’ (shakai seido), ‘social order’
(shakai no chitsujo), ‘social stability’ (shakai no antei), ‘social system’ (shakai shisu-
temu), ‘social rules’ (shakai no ruru), ‘the role of society’ (shakai no yakuwari), and
‘cooperative society’ (kyodo shakai).
For proponents, ‘a right to individuality’ (jinkaku ken) was seen as particularly
important and this was expressed using impassioned language to stress that one’s
name is part of one’s identity. They described a name as something given by lov-
ing parents that remained part of the individual throughout a life of joy and sor-
row and something to which they felt strongly attached as a symbol of who they
were. In this discourse, proponents used expressions such as ‘matter of course’
(tozen), ‘violation of’ (ihan), ‘infringe on’ (shingai), ‘restriction of’ (seigen) and
‘should be protected’ (mamorareru beki) together with the term ‘right’ (kenri).
Some opponents to reform stated that they could not understand such sentiment
with statements along the lines of, ‘Why are you so particular about a name?’.
Some proponents of reform pointed out that family unity under the same sur-
name, to which opponents ascribe, is a result of sacrifice by women who are
forced to adopt the surname of their husband, thus infringing their right to equal-
ity. This is reflected in research that has emphasized the social pressure experi-
enced by Japanese women to follow the custom of changing their surnames (Shin
2004). They also underscore the lack of privacy for women when they change
their name. This is described in terms of gender discrimination (infringement of
the right to equality) and a contravention of the constitution. On the other hand,
opponents refute that Article 750 itself is discriminatory towards women. They
reason that a husband and wife are given an opportunity to select one surname
out of two, and that they reach a decision by consensus. The opponents to
reform, using a fallacious argument, claim that because nearly all wives adopt
their husbands’ surnames it means this custom has overwhelming support from
the public.
To counter this, some proponents make emotional appeals in describing their
experiences. They explain how they felt when they lost their own surname using
words such as ‘lament’ (kuyamu), ‘regret’ (zannen), ‘sense of loss’ (soshitsu kan),
‘stress’ (sutoresu), ‘shock’ (shokku), ‘sorrow’ (kanashimi), ‘grief’ (fukai kanashimi),
‘pain’ (itami), and ‘bitterness’ (nigai keiken). For those of foreign origin (e.g.,
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Korea), there is a loss of cultural identity as well as personal identity. The name-
changers felt that, with the loss of their birth surnames, they had also lost their
premarital lives. Some wrote that even after 30 years or more they still grieve this
loss. The sense of this loss may be greater in Japan than Western countries
because people commonly call each other by their family names (Arichi 1999).
Many proponents explained that they felt they had no other choice except to suc-
cumb to pressure from their spouse and their in-laws and let their surname go.
Moreover, they described their post-marital surname as ‘the surname of another’,
‘not a real name’ and ‘not my own name’. Many described how, even after many
years of married life, they still have a sense of discomfort about being called by
the post-marital surname. One wrote that every day she suffers from being called
by the surname of her ex-husband, a person whom she now despises. This
woman, after much agonizing, decided not to revert to her original surname
because it would be different from the surname of her children (who use the sur-
name of their father).
In relation to these claims, a few people asserted that men do not have the free-
dom to change their surnames because of social pressure. As stated above, Article
750 does not prohibit a man from changing his family name to that of his wife.
However, given broader social expectations also described above, most men do
not feel comfortable with changing their surname to that of their spouse.
System
The discourse of the majority of opponents to reform defaults to an importance
placed on tradition and the protection of social order as a basis for arguing
against change. This is accompanied by emotive language nuanced by nationalis-
tic overtones. Examples of this are along these lines: ‘the Japanese marriage sys-
tem is something to be proud of’. The appeal to protect social order is often
contextualized by an expectation that confusion and disorder in Japanese society
will result from legal reform. Moreover, opponents contend that changes in the
marital law will have grave repercussions on the koseki system. They assert that
legal reform to Article 750 would inevitably require the koseki system to be
changed, which, in turn, would involve enormous human and financial costs
with a few people further warning that this would lead to the destruction of the
koseki system and ultimately, social chaos.
The interesting point being made here is the direct links between the Civil
Code concerning marriage and the koseki system. Tampering with the law is tam-
pering with the system and the broader ramifications of this would be a break-
down in the order maintained by that system. Article 750 is indeed complexly
interwoven with the koseki system. For example, a legal marriage can only be rec-
ognized, and a newly married couple can only be given a new koseki, with the reg-
istration of a head of household (hittosha), whose name must appear in full, both
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a surname and a given name. Currently, as stated above, in 96 per cent of mar-
ried cases, the husband’s surname and given name will be written down as hitto-
sha, which acts like a file name. Then the husband’s given name and his relation
to the hittosha (usually himself) and the wife’s given name (no surname) and her
relation to the hittosha (as wife) will be entered. While most Western countries
provide several options of family name(s), the Japanese law offers only one (i.e.,
family members sharing the surname of the hittosha) (Tanaka 2012). The added
complexity here is that, under the koseki system, the family is registered as a unit,
not the individual.
Proponents of reform regard the koseki as a system that creates a power differ-
ential in favor of the hittosha over other members of the family. Some proponents
further argue that this system is a vehicle by which the state forces its citizens into
conformity. They use terms that describe forceful and coercive control such as,
‘pressure’ (atsuryoku), ‘oppression’ (yokuatsu), ‘control’ (kontororu),
‘compulsion’ (kyoyo), ‘surveillance’ (kanshi), ‘coercion’ (kyosei) and ‘restriction’
(sokubaku). For proponents of reform, the fight over Article 750 is a fight against
state intervention that forces its citizens to conform to a conservative social ideal
that some claimed is a reflection of the wider movement to the right by the Japa-
nese government. They see strong opposition to the marital law reform as part of
this swing to the right.
Some reform opponents posit that ‘freedom’ already exists to choose not to
legally marry. Their logic follows that, if the system is unsuitable an individual
has the choice to live outside of it and, in turn, suffer the consequences. They
suggest a simple solution, ‘If you don’t want to change your surname, don’t
marry’ and further propose that those who do not wish to share a common family
name should choose a common law relationship (jijitsukon). Others suggest that
people should use their birth family name as a tsusho (an alias). The grammatical
pattern often used in these opinions is the Japanese conditional form, ba ii, which
flippantly suggests the solution is simple ‘all you need to do is xxx’ and ‘xxx is the
solution’. Some substantiate their claim by stating they themselves use their birth
surnames for work with little consequence, arguing that this proves change to the
marital law is unnecessary. A few opponents display a sympathetic stance
towards those who complain about the limitation of the use of birth surnames as
an alias. However, instead of supporting the marital law reform, they claim that
the focus should be on the improvement of workplace acceptance of premarital
family names.
Some of those who wish to see change in the marital law are already ‘outside
the system’ in common law relationships (Kikuchi 2009). Common law couples
usually hold wedding ceremonies, but they do not register their marriages (Shin
2008, Kikuchi 2009), and in the online forum discourse, those that declared they
were in such relationships blamed the system for forcing them to live outside of
it. Living outside of the system for such couples means there are financial disad-
vantages because they cannot access family tax reductions and inheritance laws
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cannot be applied (Tanaka 2012). Even with these disadvantages, some married
couples decide on the option of a pepa rikon (paper divorce), while continuing to
live together, to change their marital status from legal marriage to a common law
relationship so that each can create their own koseki and use their own surname.
Some couples repeatedly divorce and marry as required by the situation and their
needs (Shin 2004), such as when they have a child. This approach has been used
as a tactic to obtain both individual family names and ensure the legitimacy of
children.
Others in the forum discuss their painful experiences of separation before mar-
riage over the inability of the couple to agree on a family name. In some cases,
even though both parties agree to take up the wife’s surname, the husband’s
parents apply pressure arguing it to be dishonorable for the husband to relinquish
his family name. Some, with this experience, point to the current law as an
impediment to marriage and consequently an influence on Japan’s decreasing
birthrate. Moreover, some common law couples report that they decide not to
have children because they fear that they may be treated unfairly because their
family name arrangements do not conform to the norm. These are direct appeals
to the broader phenomenon of decreasing birthrates in contemporary Japan and
they are not without merit.
With the increase in the average marrying age in Japan (Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare 2013), there is a concomitant rise in the number of newly-
weds in established careers (Arichi 1999, Tanaka 2012). For such professionals,
a name change upon marriage has the potential to be highly detrimental. In
many cases, doing so would be to renounce a public persona linked to reputation
and achievement. One participant writes, ‘In the internet era, people search by a
known name and it is simply impossible to tell everyone about your name
change’. There are few counter opinions to these claims except, as mentioned
above, some argue that there is no fault in the marital law per se while acknowl-
edging that the administrative procedures of name changes need to be improved.
A large number of participants who had gone through the process of changing
their family name on official and business documents complained of troublesome
procedures, which consume an enormous amount of time, money, and labor.
They describe these costs using terms such as ‘irrational’ (fugori), ‘ridiculous’
(bakageta), ‘nonsensical’ (muimi), ‘idiotic’ (bakabakashı), ‘wasteful’ (muda),
‘fruitless’ (mueki), ‘futile’ (kudaranai), ‘uneconomical’ (fukeizai), ‘cumbersome’
(hanzatsu) and ‘confusing’ (konran suru). They also highlight the fact that if they
were to divorce or change their name again they would have to repeat the same
procedure. To this point there was no rebuttal from those opposing reform.
Based on different circumstances for legal marriages between Japanese and
non-Japanese spouses (i.e., international marriage), some proponents of reform
claimed that the system was already flawed. Only Japanese nationals can register
on the koseki and, even if married to a Japanese spouse, non-Japanese are
excluded from officially registering on the koseki and are usually only identified in
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the notes column of the document (bikoran) (Chapman 2012).7 When a Japanese
national marries a non-Japanese, they have the choice of assuming either the Jap-
anese or the non-Japanese surname, or retaining separate surnames. The Japa-
nese husband or wife becomes the hittosha by either continuing with their
Japanese surname or with the new non-Japanese surname. If the Japanese hus-
band or wife retains their Japanese surname and the non-Japanese partner keeps
their non-Japanese surname, they can be legally married while retaining separate
surnames.
Generally, people in Japan have gradually become aware of the introduction of
various choices available to couples in other countries and, as a result, compari-
sons are made with proponents arguing that ‘Japan is the only nation’ in the
developed democratic world that retains an ‘anachronistic’ (jidai sakugo),
‘backward’ (okureteiru) and ‘abnormal’ (ijo) system, adding to the critique of
Japan’s reluctance to change. Proponents write, ‘One name for a family may
appear to make sense in Japan, but it is nonsensical in the world’ and ‘Other
countries allow married couples to have separate surnames or a hyphenated sur-
name, Japan needs to meet the global standard’. Some proponents of reform go
as far as calling for the abolishment of the koseki system itself in preference for a
ko-seki (individual registry個籍) as opposed to a koseki (family registry戸籍).
Adding to this debate is the fact that other nations with similar systems have
opted for reform. For example, South Korea’s family law was extensively
reformed in 2005 and the household registration system (hojeok) was abolished
as recently as 2008 in light of human rights concerns expressed by civil libertar-
ians (Shin 2006, Miyamoto et al. 2011, Chapman 2012). China also has plans to
reform its hukou system to allow regional workers migrating to urban areas equal
access to welfare and other benefits (Tiezzi 2016). Moreover, these countries do
not require a married couple to have the same family name. Opponents argued
that, what they see in Korea and China is a malicious custom, which excludes
the wife from the family by not allowing her to adopt her husband’s family name.
They further contend that, ‘Japan has a wonderful one-family-one-name system,
which should induce pride’. Others say, ‘Japan should have its own system’ and
there is ‘no need to copy other countries’.
In response to critiques of the legal milieu around fufubessei, those defending
the system argue that it works well because the vast majority of families are
‘traditional families’. The high percentage (96 per cent) of married couples
choosing the husband’s surname is used as evidence to substantiate this claim.
However, the reality is that in contemporary Japan there are diverse family struc-
tures already using separate surnames and subverting legal barriers and the sys-
tem. These are families with a foreign and Japanese spouse, common law
families, legal marriage families with one spouse using an alias, divorced mothers
with children, married daughters who have assumed their husband’s family
name but live with their parents, stepfamilies and same-sex couples. The one-
family-one-surname system has, in the contemporary context, become a fac¸ade
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and does not reflect reality. Put simply, the argument for proponents is that the
system requires reform in order to equitably accommodate social change. How-
ever, opponents to reform appeal to an anachronistic approach based on tradition
and nationalistic sentiment to argue for the status quo and to protect the system.
Family ties
People who oppose law reform believe that sharing the same family name con-
tributes to the unity of a family. Reflecting the structure of the koseki system, they
emphasize that the basic unit in Japanese society is a family, and that a shared
family name works like an ID for the family. Family members unite under the
same name, and society then accepts them as a family. This thinking posits that
the family name is symbolic of the family unit and not the property of individuals.
Many in the online forum used the term kizuna to describe the very firm bond
between family members, and opponents to change approached this point from a
conservative moral position; they fear a weakening of the family kizuna if people
are allowed to use different names. One commented that reform of Article 750
would lead to a further decrease in birth rates because by not sharing a surname,
conjugal love will diminish. Another says that couples not sharing the same fam-
ily name may feel free to engage in extramarital affairs resulting in divorce. Shar-
ing the same name, they claim, is important for ensuring couples are responsible
to each other. These comments tend to be longer than others, and in some cases
are accompanied by passionate pleas ‘not to further weaken already deteriorating
family ties’.
Some opponents, mainly women, also discussed their own feelings about shar-
ing the same surname with their spouse. They report a feeling of happiness about
sharing the family name with their loved one. When they changed their sur-
names, they claimed a feeling of becoming united with their husband and recog-
nition of their union by wider society. The forum discourse also revealed,
unsurprisingly, that many believe sharing a common family name makes them
feel more united as a married couple and more responsible to each other. This is
not a belief unique to Japan, MacEacheron (2016), by analyzing several related
studies, concluded that both sexes in the US view women who retain their pre-
marital surnames as more career-focused and less dedicated to the husband and
children. The discussions on Asahi Digital Forum suggest there is still strong sen-
timent that the one-family-one-surname policy contributes to family unity. How-
ever, there is no evidence showing that not sharing the same surname leads to a
higher divorce rate or collapse of family ties, or vice versa (MacClintock 2010).
Proponents of reform acknowledged that the marital surname change might be
a happy event for some people; however, at the same time, they emphasized that
not everyone thinks this way. They asked why opponents are concerned about
other couples that do not share the same belief. Again, pushing for recognition of
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individual choice, proponents for reform argued, ‘What I choose to do is none of
their [opponents’] business. Rather, it is a private matter for the couples
concerned’.
Proponents also contended that sharing a surname has no particular contribu-
tion to kizuna. They explained that couples and family members have kizuna
because of their love and thoughtfulness, not because of their surname. They
refuted claims that sharing the same surname brings kizuna, by pointing out that
there are many couples who are kamen (masked) couples (a kamen couple refers
to an officially registered husband and wife who live like housemates or complete
strangers under the same roof). Proponents also made the point that there are
many happy international marriage couples with separate surnames within Japan,
and many more happy couples with separate surnames outside Japan. The public
opinion poll by the Japanese Cabinet Office (2012) showed that nearly 60 per
cent of people believe that sharing, or not sharing, a common name has no corre-
lation with kizuna.
Culture and tradition
Opponents to reform often referred to culture and practiced tradition as a sub-
stantive reason for continuing with present legislation and for remaining with the
status quo. They argued that, sharing the same surname as a family is a ‘custom’
(fushu) and ‘common practice’ (kanshu) and a ‘socially accepted pattern’ (shakai
tsunen), and that for this reason people should continue to follow tradition. In
these comments are also these words, ‘good old’ (furuki yoki), ‘important’ (juyo),
‘beautiful’ (utsukushı), ‘about pride’ (hokori to suru), ‘that we treasure’ (taisetsu ni
suru), ‘handed down from ancestors’ (gosenzo kara uketsuida) and ‘it suits our
country’ (waga kuni ni atta). Moreover, the grammar pattern mono-da, which
implies that this is something people are expected to do without question, was
commonly used. In some cases, opponents adopted an extreme nationalistic and
atavistic stance, arguing that the one-family-one-surname approach is a ‘Japanese
tradition’ (Nippon no dento), an essential part of ‘Japanese culture’ (Nippon no
bunka), and ‘an inherited legacy of Japan’ (Nippon no senzo denrai no isan), and
something that ‘we have to preserve’ (mamotte ikanakereba naranai). They advo-
cated for current marital law and urged that it should never be amended because
passing down the family name from ancestors to descendants is the ‘fruit of the
wisdom of our ancestors’. Claims were also made that once we allow separate
surnames in a family, ‘The Japanese tradition that has been nurtured for genera-
tions would be destroyed’. Some also showed concern that, ‘The graves of ances-
tors would be neglected’. Many provocative statements were made, such as,
‘Why do you want to destroy our traditional culture? If you don’t like it, why
don’t you migrate to another country?’.
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However, many of the claims made are actually inaccurate. First, Japanese sur-
names are a recent adoption, up until the Meiji period only a small number of
privileged people in Japanese society were allowed to have a surname (Shin
2008). Amongst those who had surnames, having different surnames within a
family was not uncommon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Maeda
2010, Tanaka 2012). It was not until the end of the nineteenth century when the
Meiji government stipulated under Civil Law that all family members must share
the surname of the male head of family (Yamanoue 1994, Arichi 1999, Sakai
2011) that the practice was widely adopted. The notion that this approach is
unique to Japan is also stretching the truth. A similar pattern is observed in West-
ern countries. For example, in England it was common for a family to have multi-
ple surnames until the eleventh century when the patrilineal family name began
to be adopted (Brooks 2013) and many countries kept the one-family-one-sur-
name system until the 1970s–1980s (MacClintock 2010).
Patrilineal naming is not uncommon even in countries that provide many
options (e.g., husband’s surname, wife’s surname, hyphenated surname, separate
surnames or new name). The majority of women continue to adopt their
husbands’ surnames, and virtually all children receive their father’s surname
(Lockwood et al. 2011, Garcia 2016, MacEacheron 2016). In North America,
where freedom of choice has been provided for over three decades, these male-
centered decisions are still observed. In Quebec, Canada, where the retention of
birth surnames by women is the legal default, passing on the father’s surname to
children is still common (MacEacheron 2016). The reasons for this surprising
trend have been speculated to be a result of tradition and strong pressure from
men (Lockwood et al. 2011). This is reinforced by the media and is somewhat
self-perpetuating in being normalized in social circles (Brooks 2013). Twenge
(1997) reports that one of the most striking results of his study is an unquestion-
ing attitude towards this custom. The ‘custom’ of marital name change for
women seems to be deeply entrenched and normalized in many societies. How-
ever, as Synder (2009, pp. 582–583) argues, ‘People and times evolve, and fol-
lowing tradition for tradition’s sake is unavailing in light of modern conceptions
of equality, the importance of names, and personal autonomy’.
Conclusion
The marital surname issue in Japan has long been the subject of debate among
feminists. The patriarchal nature of Japanese society and a legal system that sup-
ports this approach is certainly grounds for vigorous criticism in favor of the
rights of women. However, as demonstrated here, the issue of fufubessei is not
exclusively about gender discrimination even though women’s gender roles
within the family and society in general cannot be ignored. Our analysis of the
large number of opinions revealed a more holistic picture of the complicated
social context surrounding the fufubessei issue. The analyzed comments may not
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be representative of the whole population. As mentioned earlier, the respondents
of the survey may be skewed towards liberals given the nature of Asahi Digital,
and judging from the proportion of the respondents, they may be mainly middle-
aged married people who have experienced some conflicts over marital name
selection. Nevertheless, our analysis of the large number of comments posted
under a single set of conditions (online survey environment) have contributed to
advancing knowledge on this issue.
The results of this study reveal individual diversity of beliefs and attitudes
towards Article 750 reflecting the complexity of the issue. In general, proponents
of reform, claim the law violates equality, rights and liberty. From opponents
there was a strong push to conform rather than to recognize a need for individual
choice. Although the majority of proponents argue for individual choice and
opponents for social order and tradition, there is a more nuanced response by the
public revealed in the many comments made in the Asahi online forum.8 More-
over, the many personal narratives provide insight into issues on the ground and
how many in Japanese society have dealt with the law, social pressure and social
expectations and why they have followed the path they have chosen.
The argument for individual choice is supported by evidence of a changing and
diversifying Japanese society clashing with a system that requires reform. The
forum discussions highlight amongst other things, divorce, international mar-
riage, same-sex partnerships, common law marriage and single parent families as
evidence of mounting transformation and the need to allow individual freedom
and an ability to expand options. The push for reform also cites the many in Japa-
nese society exercising agency to subvert the law in order to satisfy their needs
and to avoid the restrictions that the law presents, albeit with sacrifice. Further,
discussants often quoted examples of diverse choice allowed by governments out-
side of Japan to underscore what they saw as antiquated legislation.
Opponents of reform present their case mostly in the context of a consequen-
tial breakdown in the system and social order. The interwoven nature of the Civil
Code and Household Registration Law (koseki ho) means that reform of marital
law would have knock-on effects for the koseki system and for the broader legal
sphere. The Meiji government, as early as 1871, concerned about Tokugawa dis-
order, introduced the koseki ho as part of the modernizing process and to enforce
social order. This concern for social order has been entrenched and is further
exacerbated by pressures created by social change and the voices advocating for
the recognition of this change. For many of the opponents, social order equates
to tradition and normative notions of family, marriage and custom as enshrined
in law and without which, chaos would reign. Throughout the discussions how-
ever, this chaos and disorder is never clearly articulated or described and this
leads one to believe that, for opponents of reform, perhaps diversity and change
themselves are the chaos they refer to. This is despite legislative reform of the
Civil Code being a common feature of the legal landscape of modern Japan.
20 Resistance and reform
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
Q 
Li
bra
ry]
 at
 19
:02
 28
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
An increasing proportion of the public is becoming supportive of marital
reform regardless of their choice of a marital surname. The Cabinet Office public
opinion poll conducted in 2012 revealed that the general public is moving
towards acceptance of diversity with approximately 70 per cent of people
responding that they would accept legal recognition of common law marriage. In
the same survey, 60 per cent of people responded that they support some sort of
law reform (36 per cent for legally allowing separate surnames and 24 per cent
for legally allowing the use of an alias). This survey also showed that younger
generations (twenties to fifties) support a fufubessei (separate surname) option as
a new form of legal marriage (40–47 per cent). This is in contrast with older gen-
erations (sixties to seventies) expressing reservations (20–34 per cent). However,
along with the increase in support of reform and acceptance, there has been as
increase in activities campaigning for the status quo. For example, street cam-
paigns, published books, internet articles, and YouTube videos advocating the
traditional family have emerged in increasing numbers with the strong support of
powerful elites invested in presenting this change as harmful for Japanese society
and the nation.
The Supreme Court followed up its 2015 decision with advice that the marital
surname issue be further discussed and decided in the Diet, taking public opinion
into consideration (Tokyo Shinbun 2015). The government is expected to hold
constructive discussions based on factual data without bias toward public opin-
ion. However, it seems that the Prime Minister and the majority of his Liberal
Democratic Party are taking a side. Media sources disclose that the mastermind
of the current government’s hardline stance is the formidable ultra-right Nippon
Kaigi (Asahi digital 2016) discussed above. Prime Minister Abe is a special advi-
sor to this organization with over half of his Cabinet, and about third of the Diet
listed as Nippon Kaigi members (Economist 2015). This organization emphasizes
tradition and culture and an orderly society, and claims that fufubessei (separate
surnames) is an issue that shakes the very foundation of the country (Nippon
Kaigi) – see Figure 4.
In the rhetoric of Nippon Kaigi, only families that fall in line with normative
notions are acceptable and those existing outside of this are unwelcome. Reflect-
ing Prime Minister Abe’s Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision For Japan (utsu-
kushii kuni e), the Nippon Kaigi further argues that Japan needs to be rebuilt as a
truly ‘beautiful’ country (Nippon Kaigi) by discouraging imported notions of
Western rights and liberty, and stressing duties to the family, state and the
emperor (Economist 2015, Nippon Kaigi). Despite the scaremongering by the
ultra-right Nippon Kaigi, perceptions on marriage and family are changing in
Japan. According to a recent white paper published by the Ministry of Health,
Labor andWelfare (Ministry of Health, Labor andWelfare 2013), public percep-
tions on marriage have shifted from notions of a broader civil responsibility to
providing for individual choice. The number of marriages is decreasing steadily
and, for those who marry, the average age at marriage and the age at the first
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childbirth are increasing. These factors are considered to be major causes of
Japan’s low birth rate (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2013). There are a
number of factors deterring people in Japan from marriage and childbirth. For
example, aversion to traditional marriage, increasing time spent in education, a
decline in the availability and stability of jobs, an increase in employment oppor-
tunities for women, detrimental effects in the labor market for taking time-off for
child raising and rigid social expectations of a determined life trajectory – study,
work, financial independence, marriage and having children (Rindfuss et al.
2010).
As described in this study, the decision that a couple has to make over their
family surname can be a deterrent for marriage. The results of the Cabinet Office
public opinion poll (2012) showed that, for over 30 per cent of the people, a sur-
name is a name that has been passed on from generation-to-generation rather
than a code for self-identification or for the family unit. Approximately 40 per
cent of the people (over 50 per cent of people in their thirties) think that there
may be cases where marriage has been hindered by disagreements over choosing
a family name. Furthermore, there will be an increasing number of families with
only one child, which means that the family name could be lost if the child choo-
ses to change surnames upon marriage. In other words, the tradition of patrilineal
name choice which opponents advocate can only be continued based on the sac-
rifice of such families.
On the other hand, in many countries, patrilineal surnames prevail despite the
flexibility of marital surname choice (Lockwood et al. 2011, Garcia 2016,
Figure 4 The Japanese family after introducing separate surname legislation9 http://www.nippon
kaigi.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/beseihan2208281.pdf
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MacEacheron 2016). However, in these countries traditional families and uncon-
ventional families coexist harmoniously. Given the strong social assumption,
expectation and pressures, the majority of people in Japan would likely continue
the custom of a wife assuming the husband’s surname for the foreseeable future,
even if marital law were changed. However, the importance of reform to Civil
Code article 750 is not in how many will directly benefit from the change, or how
many will initially counter tradition and social custom, it is in the message that
Japan recognizes different ways of being a family and that social diversity be cele-
brated instead of scorned. Judging from the recent social changes in Japan as
mentioned above, and an increasing trend of non-traditional marital surname
choices in other countries (Scheuble and Johnson 2007, Noack and Wik 2008,
Domjen 2011), it is reasonable to expect that reform is inevitable. It is just a
matter of when.
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Notes
1. This has included the publishing survey results, writing letters to ministers, holding meetings
with lawyers and politicians and collecting petition.
2. Prior generations of this organization had been formed much earlier (Takashima 2016)
3. Other data will be used here for a triangulation purposes.
4. User Local (http://textmining.userlocal.jp/).
5. https://www.random.org/lists/.
6. The comments have been translated by the authors.
7. In many cases the foreign spouse is noted on the registry but not officially registered.
8. Karl J. Krogness found similar results in a survey he conducted in 2009, which reveal an evolv-
ing perception among respondents that koseki is directly related to social order and individual
rights (Krogness 2013, p. 262).
9. The diagram speculates on what may happen if Article 750 is reformed and shows a family
where members have a diverse range of surnames and contains a negative caption that asks,
‘What sort of family is ours?!’.
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